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A decade after the financial crisis, another shock is deeply affecting 
the Irish welfare state. At the time of writing, in April 2021, the Covid-
adjusted unemployment rate is 24.2 per cent (Central Statistics Office, 
2021) – well above the peak of the last crisis, when unemployment 
hovered at about 15 per cent. The contributions to this special issue 
were written in the throes of the pandemic. They reflect on a decade 
of intense social policy change during which mandatory job-search and 
other forms of conditionality have been intensified and extended to 
more people, including lone parents, as Ireland has followed other 
OECD countries in turning towards activation. The ‘activation turn’ 
(Bonoli, 2010, p. 435) is an umbrella term describing the reconfigura -
tion of labour market policies towards supply-side interventions 
designed to either enhance employability through training or, more 
commonly in liberal welfare states, to propel unemployed people into 
work via widening benefits conditionality, stronger worker incentives 
and toughened sanctions. The pursuit of this latter ‘workfare’ 
approach has often coincided, internationally, with a second track of 
‘government and management reform’ (Brodkin, 2013b, p. 13). 
Countries have increasingly turned to outsourcing, competitive 
procurement and performance-based contracting, among other 
governance instruments, to streamline the delivery of Public 
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Employment Services (PES) and other activation programmes. 
Ireland is no exception. Programmes targeted at the long-term 
unemployed are being privatised, with the latest iteration of 
procurement happening as recently as March 2021.  
In this introduction, we contextualise this decade of active labour 
policy reform by reviewing the key changes to income supports and 
PES that have unfolded since the financial crisis. The reforms 
discussed, and outlined in various iterations of Pathways to Work 
(Government of Ireland, 2012, 2016), form a core plank of the 
government’s strategy to achieve its employment targets and related 
commitments under the Europe 2020 Strategy. They also reflect a 
consensus among administrative and policy elites that a work-first, 
sanctions-oriented activation model was overdue in Ireland (Grubb et 
al., 2009; McGuinness et al., 2011). Indeed, there was a widespread 
view that Ireland was a ‘laggard’ (Köppe & MacCarthaigh, 2019; 
Wiggan, 2015) or ‘outlier’ (Dukelow & Considine, 2014b; Millar & 
Crosse, 2018). The OECD likened Ireland’s pre-crisis activation 
regime to ‘the emperor who had no clothes’ (Martin, 2015, p. 9), in 
that there was only minimal implementation of the formal policy com -
mitments to activation under Ireland’s National Employment Action 
Plan. The Great Recession was a window of opportunity to introduce 
reforms that were largely consistent with the mutual obligations model 
promoted by the OECD and the active labour market policy 
associated with the Europe 2020 Strategy. While the reforms evolved 
in the context of the troika’s conditional loan programme 
(International Monetary Fund, European Commission and the 
European Central Bank), they are a domestic project. International 
actors ‘were pushing on an open door’ (Dukelow, 2015; Hick, 2018).  
In reflecting on the past decade of reform, our aim is to briefly 
review the key social policy and governance shifts shaping the 
trajectory of Irish welfare reform and, in so doing, to develop an 
analytical perspective that frames these twin tracks of reform as 
involving a process of ‘double activation’. This perspective views the 
New Public Management (NPM) tools, such as performance-based 
contracting, now being used to coordinate and direct frontline service 
delivery, as being ‘cut from the same neoliberal cloth’ (Soss et al., 
2013, p. 138) as the conditionality regimes targeted towards claimants. 
It sees governance reforms of operational services and social policy 
reforms of income supports as being deeply interconnected, eschewing 
distinctions between what activation policies are pursued politically 
and how they are implemented administratively. This ‘double 
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activation’ perspective orients the contributions to this special issue 
insofar as the articles engage with both the policy substance of 
activation reform, from the perspective of conditionality and 
retrenchment, and the institutions of policy delivery, from the 
perspective of PES governance reforms.  
We proceed by reflecting on activation from the perspective of 
conditionality, drawing on recently published relevant academic 
literature. We then turn to activation’s ‘double dynamic’ (Newman, 
2007), and the shifting relationships between the state, the market and 
the community sector that PES governance reforms entail. We 
conclude with an overview of the individual articles comprising this 
special issue, and the overarching conclusions they reach about the 
challenge of ongoing active labour policy reform.  
 
Conditionality  
Until recently, the Irish income support system was largely understood 
as a de facto system of ‘passive’ entitlements in that active labour 
market programmes were highly fragmented. An Foras Áiseanna 
Saothair (FÁS), the National Training and Employment Authority, 
was institutionally separated from the department administering 
income supports, albeit there was a relatively strong sanctions regime 
up to the mid 1990s with enforcement of obligations on actively 
seeking and accepting work (Cousins, 2019). Arguing Irish policy was 
‘more carrot than stick’, McGuinness et al. (2011) contended that 
unemployed people engaged with through the late 1990s’ National 
Employment Action Plan were more likely to remain unemployed 
than people who had no such engagement. This influenced and 
consolidated an emerging consensus that the system needed reform 
away from ‘a regime with minimal monitoring and sanctions’.  
In a significant turn towards what an OECD review described as ‘a 
more coercive approach’ (Grubb et al., 2009, p. 130), Ireland followed 
other OECD countries in turning towards activation. Under Pathways 
to Work (Government of Ireland, 2012), a series of penalties were 
introduced, amounting to 25 per cent of the unemployment payment, 
for refusal or failure to attend meetings requested by the Department 
of Employment Affairs and Social Protection (DEASP), failure to 
demonstrate proof of job-seeking, or failure to participate in an 
appropriate employment support scheme, work experience or 
training. In 2014 this sanctions regime was extended to lone parents 
whose youngest child was over thirteen years of age.   
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Cousins’ (2019) analysis of the new Irish conditionality regime 
assessment is marred by the limited empirical evidence and lack of 
formal publication of compliance data but concludes that the rate of 
sanctions in Ireland remains relatively modest. Grouping three policy 
changes which work to incentivise people to seek work, he analyses 
increased sanctions for jobseekers, reductions in benefits for young 
single claimants and a reduction in the age (of children) for which 
lone-parent benefits are payable. Both Cousins (2019) and McCashin 
(2018) point to the limits of Irish conditionality, observing a political 
reluctance to extend conditional activation to mothers of younger 
children (both lone parents and qualified adults) and people with 
disabilities. Murphy (2018) and the National Economic and Social 
Council (NESC) (Johnston & McGauran, 2018) both discuss how 
individualisation of social welfare might impact on the extension of 
activation (and related conditionalities) to qualified adults and note 
that the Jobseeker’s Transitional (JST) Payment creates the 
opportunity to offer enabling support without coercive sanctions.1  
Boland & Griffin’s (2015a, 2015b) theorising of shifts in the 
condition of unemployment and welfare reform critiques the Pathways 
to Work regime, and related technologies including conditionalities, as 
‘governmentalising’, whereby institutions scrutinise and categorise 
individuals, set them tasks, observe their behaviour and threaten 
punishment. Their focus is on the construction of unemployment as a 
‘liminal’ experience, conditioned by policies that discipline jobseekers 
into becoming actors in the labour market. They see an intensification 
of the process, and the required conditions, as well as their extension 
to a potentially wider range of claimants, including people in part-time 
employment, under the second iteration of Pathways to Work 
(Government of Ireland, 2016). Unlike Cousins (2019), Boland & 
Griffin (2016) find not a modest but a significant increase in the 
relative application of sanctions. They argue that this is part of a pan-
European shift to make PES more employer-centric by ensuring a 
supply of labour at competitive rates and critique the lack of 
independent analyses of impacts on health (mental and physical), 
future earnings and behaviour.  
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1 The JST is a form of Jobseeker’s Allowance (JA) for lone parents whose youngest 
child is aged between seven and thirteen years of age. Compared with the JA, the JST 
allows wider opportunities to work part-time and/or participate in education while 
receiving income supports. There is no obligation to be available and looking for full-
time work.
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Dukelow & Considine (2014a) contextualise the turn to activation 
in the context of welfare retrenchment and point to the regulatory role 
of activation policy and sanctions in servicing the needs of competition 
(see also Collins & Murphy, 2016). Dukelow (2015) argues that the 
‘radical retrenchment and reform of social protection is taking place 
to ensure its closer compatibility with the perceived needs of a 
globalised neo-liberal economic paradigm’. Dukelow, in this issue, 
continues this theme, examining the relationship between 
conditionality and structural retrenchments of income support, which 
lead to some citizens being sacrificed for international 
competitiveness. Joe Whelan’s research on the lived experience of 
worklessness and welfare in Ireland highlights the now ‘compulsive 
geography of the welfare state’ (Whelan, 2021a, p. 47), and how the 
spectre of shame and stigma are operationalised through social and 
administrative contexts to form a ‘toxic symbiosis’ (Whelan, 2021b) 
which continually valorises a work ethic. Likewise, Gaffney & Millar 
(2020) relate the emergence of welfare fraud as a contentious issue, 
with the workfarist turn leading to the ‘scapegoating’ of welfare 
claimants and constituting them as subjects under constant 
surveillance. Nuala Whelan, in this issue, also examines workers’ and 
claimants’ experiences of PES, and points to the ‘missing middle’, 
arguing that attention to implementation can provide a less 
stigmatised, claimant-focused service. Also in this issue, Johnston & 
McGauran identify gaps in training, career guidance and links to 
employers, as well as enabling support services that require better 
inter-agency coordination to meet claimants’ needs.  
 
Governance and marketisation 
Alongside the policy reforms reviewed above, there has also been 
sweeping reform of PES institutions and delivery organisations. Two 
entirely new services, Intreo and JobPath, have been created in 
conjunction with significant changes to the way in which externally 
delivered programmes are procured. Administrative responsibility for 
service commissioning has also been centralised within the 
Department of Social Protection (DSP) following the dissolution of 
FÁS in the wake of a corporate governance scandal, and the 
consolidation of income and employment supports (Köppe & 
MacCarthaigh, 2019). This integration of employment and income 
support was already standard in European countries, and the OECD 
review of Irish activation urged the government ‘to gain better control 
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of its own administration’ by following suit (Grubb et al., 2009, p. 95). 
In March 2010 the proposal to merge income and employment 
supports was formally announced, and from 2012 to 2016 a national 
network of sixty full-service centres was progressively built up. This 
roll-out also brought with it the introduction of a new active case 
management model and the targeting of services based on claimants’ 
‘Probability of Exit’ (PEX) from the live register, as predicted by a 
profiling instrument developed by the Economic and Social Research 
Institute (ESRI) (O’Connell et al., 2009). Claimants with a low PEX 
rating were prioritised for monthly meetings whereas those with a high 
PEX rating were interviewed only after six months. However, in an 
early evaluation, the ESRI found the PEX model ‘was not properly 
implemented’ in that many claimants did not have a PEX rating while 
the ratings of those who did were often based on limited data and ‘not 
usable’ (Kelly et al., 2019, p. iii). Nevertheless, the PEX model remains 
in use as the primary means used to target service delivery.  
The consolidation of employment services within the DSP also had 
broader ramifications for how externally delivered PES were 
contracted. At the time of the crisis, the main externally provided PES 
were the Local Employment Services (LES), which are currently 
delivered by twenty-two community organisations and local 
development companies. The LES were established in the mid 1990s 
as parallel employment guidance services to FÁS for those with 
greater employment barriers. Participation was voluntary. However, 
following the crisis, the LES were brought under the National Employ -
ment Action Plan and responsibility for commissioning changed to the 
DSP. As a result, claimants could be mandatorily referred to the LES 
as part of their mutual obligations. The DSP’s approach to annually 
contracting the LES has also subtly changed in recent years. Although 
the LES are paid on a ‘costs met’ (Indecon, 2018, p. iii) rather than 
performance basis, their achievement of performance targets has been 
increasingly monitored by the DSP since 2012. McGann, in this issue, 
situates these changes within the context of a wider post-2011 public 
sector reform agenda, spearheaded by the Department of Public 
Expenditure and Reform (DPER). Resonating with NPM ideas about 
public sector inefficiency due to weak accountability and the absence 
of performance incentives, DPER has placed an increasing emphasis 
on performance-monitoring public services and leveraging opportuni -
ties for outsourcing to deliver more efficient services.  
Reflecting this new orientation towards performance measurement 
and outsourcing, one of the most significant governance reforms was 
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the creation of JobPath, a Payment-by-Results quasi-market, in mid 
2015. The decision to procure JobPath was first mooted in 2011, 
although tenders were not invited until December 2013. The 
programme was closely modelled on the UK government’s Work 
Programme (WP), and the two agencies contracted to deliver JobPath 
– Seetec and Turas Nua, which started as a joint venture between the 
Irish cooperative FRS Recruitment and the UK-based Working Links 
– were both experienced WP providers. Nonetheless, there were 
several differences with the WP,  the most important of which was 
JobPath’s ‘grey box’ (Wiggan, 2015) design. The DSP mandated 
minimum servicing standards to which both providers would have to 
adhere, whereas under the WP’s ‘black box’ contracting model, it was 
largely left to agencies to determine the nature and intensity of 
services. JobPath providers could also be financially sanctioned for 
poor ratings in independent user-satisfaction surveys. This was 
designed to mitigate the risk of providers gaming by concentrating on 
servicing those clients closest to employment while ‘parking’ their 
more disadvantaged clients – a practice that was endemic under the 
WP (Carter & Whitworth, 2015). For these reasons, Wiggan (2015) 
describes JobPath as a ‘cautious embrace of market rationality’. 
Nonetheless, as Murphy highlights in this issue, JobPath marked a 
watershed moment in PES governance. It was a decisive turn towards 
coordinating PES commissioning via competitive tendering and 
Payment-by-Results, with Murphy & Hearne (2019, p. 457) suggesting 
that it amounted to ‘privatisation by stealth’. This was due to the 
absence of public attention or significant protest against the 
marketisation reform at the time, but also because of how the 
contract’s Payment-by-Results funding model and requirement that 
prospective bidders have an annual turnover of €20 million effectively 
locked out community-based organisations from delivering the 
programme. Murphy & Hearne (2019) position this marketisation 
reform in the context of the increased legitimation and use of results-
based payment models to outsource services by the state.  
Competitive procurement and performance-based contracting are 
both expected to form important planks of future PES commissioning, 
with official evaluations of contracted PES laying the groundwork for 
extending the market governance of activation. The evaluation of 
JobPath found that the rate of employment was 20 to 26 per cent 
higher among participants than in comparatively matched cohorts who 
did not participate, concluding that ‘it is possible to achieve positive 
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results for unemployed people with a payment-by-results contractual 
model’ (DEASP, 2019, p. x). In its review of the LES, the economic 
consultancy Indecon (2018, p. xiii) recommended that the DSP 
actively consider basing future service provision on ‘an open/public 
competitive procurement model’ and clear targets ‘in relation to 
sustainment of employment outcomes’. This recommendation is now 
being taken up in the process, announced in October 2020, of 
expanding community-based PES into four new geographical areas 
where LES do not currently operate. The DSP is also understood to be 
actively considering a shift towards ‘costs-bid’ procurement for LES, 
which would see agencies potentially forced to compete on costs such 
as staff salaries.  
A wider review of future PES commissioning was nearing 
completion when Ireland went into lockdown in March 2020, with  
the existing JobPath and LES contracts due to expire in December 
2020. In the first lockdown, job-search requirements were suspended, 
and all contracted PES staff were retained and worked remotely,  
with the focus on supportively keeping in touch and filling vacancies as 
they arose. From early June 2020, contact was resumed for the 
purposes of activation, and contracted agencies were advised that 
normal services would resume but be adjusted with greater client 
numbers per caseworker. However, as second and third lockdowns 
emerged, PES have effectively been in cold storage. Following the 
recommendation of the Labour Market Advisory Council, PES 
contracts have now been rolled over until December 2021, when it is 
anticipated that the demand for contracted services will further  
grow as more people now receiving the Pandemic Unemployment 
Payment (PUP) become subject to activation. The PUP income 
support has been a swift and relatively generous response to the 
pandemic crisis, which waived conditionality. However, government 
may struggle to apply condi tional work requirements to PUP 
claimants whose ‘normal’ employ ment was suspended on public health 
grounds, and who may not consider themselves ‘unemployed’. Such 
discontinuity may lead to public ambiguity about conditionality, which 
McCashin (2018) argues was already evident pre Covid in relation to 
expanding activation to lone parents and those with disabilities. 
Murphy, in this issue, argues that given the profile of PUP claimants 
in comparison to ‘typical’ live register cohorts, many may question 
what is ‘reasonable’ to be activated into, resisting condition ality  
and poor-quality employment (Labour Market Advisory Council, 
2020, p. 13). 
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Overview of contributions 
Despite the significant investment and reform, the impact of the post-
financial crisis reforms on the labour market reintegration of the long-
term unemployed remains unclear due to the absence of independent 
research on both the efficacy of conditionality and the marketisation 
of PES. This is consistent with what Boyle (2014) finds is an 
underdeveloped culture of evaluation. As discussed above, several 
official quantitative evaluations, undertaken on behalf of the DSP and 
in conjunction with the OECD, have now been published and point 
towards a relative efficacy of PES (DEASP, 2019; Indecon, 2018; Kelly 
et al., 2019). However, there remain significant gaps in knowledge of 
the experiences of PES, and related activation policies, from either 
claimants’ or workers’ perspectives. The Irish National Organisation 
of the Unemployed (INOU), using focus groups as a methodology, has 
published qualitative assessments of unemployed people’s experience 
of service delivery in Intreo (INOU, 2014), Local Employment 
Services Networks (INOU, 2016) and JobPath (INOU, 2019), while 
NESC (Johnston & McGauran, 2018) has published a major 
examination of services for the unemployed, which, among other 
methodologies, drew on qualitative interviews.  
Building on this qualitative work, this special issue elucidates new 
analytical perspectives for interpreting the trajectories and impacts of 
reform. In particular, many of the contributions bring a ‘street-level’ 
perspective to the analysis of how activation policies change 
experiences of welfare and unemployment. Such an approach begins 
from the perspective that the welfare state ‘does not live in abstract 
regulations and legal texts but rather in the day-to-day interactions 
between caseworkers and clients in local welfare offices’ (Rice, 2013, 
p. 1055). Key to a street-level orientation is also understanding the 
role of service delivery organisations and staff as ‘de facto 
policymakers’ who shape policy content ‘and the distribution of 
benefits and services through their actions’ (Brodkin, 2013a, p. 23). 
Regulations and policy guidelines are rarely as tightly defined as 
intended. Policy implementation therefore becomes ‘suffused by 
moments of policymaking’ (Zacka, 2017, p. 247) as caseworkers weigh 
often conflicting or ambiguous policy goals against organisational 
demands and the personal complexities of individual cases. These 
interpretative dynamics play out under varying organisational 
conditions, and in the hands of caseworkers who each bring their own 
world views and understandings of issues to this process. Changing the 
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organisational and professional conditions in which policy delivery is 
embedded can therefore lead to different policies being produced, 
bringing into view the intersections between the formal social policy 
turns towards activation and the ‘new ways of public management’ 
(van Berkel & van der Aa, 2005, p. 331) now orienting PES delivery.  
The issue begins with McGann framing this ‘double activation’ 
perspective, positioning quasi-marketisation and workfare as welfare-
to-work bedfellows. That the two reform tracks have coincided in 
numerous countries (Denmark, the Netherlands, the UK, Australia 
and now Ireland) is no accident given how both quasi-marketisation 
and workfarist activation rest on shared logics of governing people – 
whether claimants or service workers – at a distance through targeted 
incentives. Moreover, he argues that both reform tracks involve 
varying degrees of claimant commodification, with quasi-
marketisation amounting to a form of ‘hyper-commodification’ 
whereby claimants are constituted as an intermediary market of non-
employed labour that can be acquired by third parties (employment 
services providers) and sold on for profit.  
This theme of commodification is taken up by Dukelow in her 
commentary on the role of activation and retrenchment in Ireland’s 
political economy. The point of departure for her analysis is the 
emphasis in the 2016 Pathways to Work strategy on activation as a 
means to ‘ensure a supply of labour at competitive rates’ (Government 
of Ireland, 2016, p. 14). Dukelow sees the turn towards activation as 
embedded within a broader suite of retrenchment measures, including 
shifts in the provision of income support towards greater reliance on 
means-tested benefits. This analysis underscores how ‘activation policy 
does not approach the labour market as a given’ but is pivotal to the 
state’s involvement ‘in market making’ and reinforcing competitive 
labour market dynamics. She argues that the combination of activation 
and retrenchment has resulted in a hierarchy of ‘welfare sacrifice’ 
where, through an evolving set of welfare practices, claimants are 
being made into a low-cost army of labour for the sake of maintaining 
an internationally competitive labour market.  
The next three articles appraise the effectiveness of Ireland’s turn 
towards a more conditional activation model from the lived 
experiences of claimants and frontline workers. Reporting on forty-
two interviews with jobseekers, Finn highlights how the introduction 
of conditionality restructures the caseworker–claimant relationship 
around tighter monitoring of claimant adherence to mutual 
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obligations. However, Finn’s analysis suggests the focus on jobseeker 
compliance gives rise to a superficiality of engagement in which 
participation is primarily experienced as a ‘bureaucratic formality’. 
Claimants feign compliance in response to encountering a ‘systemic 
indifference’ to their personal circumstances and needs. Whelan’s 
article, also drawing on original qualitative research with key 
stakeholders involved in implementing Pathways to Work, similarly 
suggests that the emphasis on mutual obligations and compliance has 
produced a depersonalising system of supports. She partly attributes 
this to the preoccupation of bureaucratic elites with administratively 
managing the organisational change aspects of the reforms through a 
vertical implementation structure, rather than a focus on increasing 
the employability of jobseekers, leading to a highly administrative and 
work-focused activation approach. Johnston & McGauran’s article 
draws on qualitative data to examine claimants’ experiences of 
Ireland’s reformed one-stop-shop Intreo service model. In so doing, 
their analysis identifies several ongoing gaps in training, career 
guidance and links to employers, as well as enabling support services 
such as childcare and housing that remain barriers to a more 
integrated PES approach. They highlight the need for a diversity of 
PES approaches to reflect local variation and call for a greater focus 
on inter-agency coordination to build a more tailored PES capable of 
responding to the multiple and complex needs of more disadvantaged 
claimants.  
In the final contribution, Murphy develops a blueprint for how such 
a public employment ecosystem might take shape post Covid. Drawing 
on the concept of a Strategic Action Field, she unpacks the drivers and 
dynamics of the post-crisis administrative shift towards a workfare-
oriented system, underpinned by centralised governance structures 
and the entry of new private actors through quasi-marketisation. 
These dynamics of centralisation and privatisation have, over time, 
produced ‘co-opetition’ between local public, private and not-for-
profit policy actors at the expense of enabling more integrated and 
effective services. To enable a more joined-up and integrated PES 
ecosystem, Murphy argues for a return to more network-governance-
oriented approaches to ‘co-producing’ PES commissioning. 
Highlighting the different delivery actors and mechanisms already in 
place in Ireland, she envisages a shift towards public, private and 
community actors collaboratively planning and delivering services in 
local partnerships as an alternative to centralised competitive 
procurement.  
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What emerges from the qualitative, ground-level analysis of the 
contributions to this special issue is a system of PES that continues to 
remain highly fragmented. Rather than this resulting in greater 
engagement and more enabling services to support personalised 
labour market (re)integration pathways, the contributions depict a 
‘bluntly tailored’ system that is oriented by the logic of administrative 
compliance and the performance of accountability. Income and 
employment supports may be integrated, but inter-agency 
collaboration remains weak and hindered by the low-trust, competitive 
environment surrounding external service commissioning. This low-
trust environment extends to the micro level of claimant–advisor 
relationships, wherein the regulatory demands of participation put 
these interactions on a transactional and superficial, rather than 
personalised, footing. The indifference and depersonalisation of 
jobseekers’ experiences recounted in the contributions jar with the 
image, repeatedly invoked in the Pathways to Work strategies, of a new 
system of flexibly tailored supports.  
A theme threaded throughout is what the present pandemic means 
for the future trajectory of activation in Ireland. If the Great 
Recession afforded a policy window for Ireland to turn towards double 
activation, the Covid crisis presents an opportunity to pause and 
review this shift and to reorient income and employment supports 
towards more enabling services rather than regulatory activation. 
While the embrace of a ‘work-first’-led model following the financial 
crisis did have some success in reintegrating short-term unemployed 
jobseekers back into employment, the contributions highlight that a 
significant minority were ultimately left behind and did not experience 
economic or social recovery. This was especially the case for people 
who already had a history of long-term unemployment coupled with 
complex non-vocational issues impacting their participation such as 
mental health, caring responsibilities, homelessness or housing 
insecurity. As a small, open political economy, Ireland is particularly 
vulnerable to global shocks and needs strong enabling institutions to 
facilitate adaptation to the fourth industrial revolution (automation, 
digitalisation and AI) and climate change. NESC’s (2020) report on 
the future of social welfare in Ireland stresses the value of supporting 
high levels of participation through a more inclusive PES, oriented 
more towards flexicurity, and proposals for a pilot ‘Participation 
Income’ to shift the focus away from conditionality towards choice and 
dignity. An early reflection on the pandemic policy responses points 
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towards reforms that combine a PES with a reformed, individualised 
social security system that is unconditional but enables citizens to 
reciprocally contribute and participate, and where income is sufficient 
and non-stigmatising for all.  
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